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In an effort to analyze small unit fire and maneuver tactics,
Lanchester's Square Law is used as the basis for a model relating
major combat variables of infantry engagements. An investigation
encompassing 90 different computer battle simulations with varying
levels of attacking force size, rush distance length, number of units
composing the attacking force, and defending force fire distribution
is reported. Conclusions of the results of the battle simulations
and suggested extensions of the model are discussed
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TABLE OF SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS
A(t) Attacking force size at time (t).
Al(t) The number of maneuvering combatants
of attacking force at time t.
A2.(t)
'A
The number of attacking force combat-
ants in the i th unit of the base of
fire at time t.
AP Assault position.
BL Basic individual load of ammunition
(number of rounds carried).
C
fl
Attacking force attrition rate
coefficient.
Cpj Defending force attrition rate
coefficient.
D(t) Defending force size at time t.
Dl(t) The number of defending combatants
firing on the moving attackers.
D2(t) The number of defending combatants
firing on the attacking force base
of fire.
-Tr ' tt Loss rates of respective forces.
HP Single shot hit probability, assuming
circular normal distribution.
HPA1 Probability that an attacker is killed
while running.
HPA1, Probability that a moving attacker is
killed during the TC time units he is
prone and getting ready to fire and
before another attacking force unit
rushes forward.
HPA2. Probability that an attacker in the



















Probability that a defender is killed.
Line of departure
.
Combatant's probability of killing
opposing forces in individual encounters,
Rate at which a combatant encounters the
opposing force. (One encounter implies
one round fired.
)
Range from attacking force to defending
force (meters).
Rush distance; the distance the maneu-
vering attackers move in a straight line
from one prone position to another prone
position (meters).
Radius of the circular target area
equivalent to that presented by an
attacker in an up and moving posture
(inches).
Radius of the circular target area
equivalent to that presented by a prone
attacker (inches).
Radius of the circular target area
equivalent to that presented by a
defender (inches).
Rate of advance of attacking force
(meters/minute).
Attacking force rate of fire (rounds/
minute)
.
Maximum attacking force rate of fire
(rounds/minute).
Minimum attacking force rate of fire
(rounds/minute).
Time it takes the attacking force to
come within maximum effective range
of the weapons employed.
Time it takes the attackers to reach
the final assault position.
Time required by defenders to acquire
an attacking target.
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Tfn Time required by defenders to fire
their weapons (i.e., time between trigger
pulls).
TAR Time for the entire attacking force
to move one rush distance.
TC Coordinating time between unit move-
ments of the attacking force.
T
D
Reciprocal of defenders' rate of fire.
TMAXA Defending force maximum time to acquire
an attacking target.
TMAXF Defending force maximum time to fire.
TMINA Defending force minimum time to acquire
an attacking target.
TMINF Defending force minimum time to fire.
TR Time for an attacker to move one rush
distance.
u Total number of units comprising the
attacking force.
a(j) Aiming error in mils (radial dispersion
of rounds)
.
a(TR) A weighted aiming error used in calcu-
lating hit probabilities against the
maneuvering combatants.
n Fraction of attacking force assigned to
maneuver.
Y Fraction of battle time that a combatant
is not exposed and, hence, not firing.
Y f
Fraction of a force not exposing them-
selves at any instant of time due to
fire suppression.
y Fraction of total battle time used by
ri one combatant to reload.
x Fraction of the basic load of ammunition
expended by a combatant in the attack.





The purpose of the study reported in this thesis was to identify and
relate the major variables of small -unit infantry combat engagements in
such a manner that different tactical fire and maneuver policies could
be studied. With Lanchester's Square Law providing a point of departure,
a model of small unit combat was developed in which major parameters of
an encounter known to be time or range dependent were so treated, thus
incorporating realism of dynamic combat.
The single uncontrolled variable of the model is force size. Force
sizes were specified at the start of each computer battle simulation,
however these sizes were updated by the computer program every one-tenth
of a minute of the battle. The remaining variables were controlled in
that they were either assumed, calculated from other data, or direct
input values from other research. Values were taken from research by
other authors, military recorded statistics, and personal combat know-
ledge. Success in battle was considered dependent upon infliction of
casualties on the opposing force and the range between the forces at the
termination of the engagement.
To analyze various tactical combinations and situations a computer
program of a small unit engagement was run. The tactics investigated
were various constant rush distances for the attacker in combination with
the size of the rushing unit. For each battle investigated these two
parameters were varied. The rushing unit was taken as a portion of the
attacking force, with the entire offensive force moving forward in the
attack by incremental rushes. The attackers were opposed by a static-
position defending force. The distribution of defensive fire was also
varied between battles but remained constant for a given engagement.
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The computer output from 90 different battles was analyzed for
tactical implications rather than specific numerical answers. This
generated battle data implied that rush distances of 30 to 40 meters,
in combination with two or three units comprising the attacking force,
produced the highest degree of success for the attackers.
The results of the model application support the Marine Corps doc-
trine of triangular force structure. However, the rush distance results




"The mission of the rifle squad is to locate, close with, and
destroy the enemy by fire and maneuver " [33] Such a demanding and
important mission for small units suggests that considerable support
should be given toward the accomplishment of that unit's objectives.
Support involves not only military logistic and fire support during
combat operations, but also includes effort in planning and preparing
for the operation. Research for improved tactical policies, more effi-
cient weapons allocations, better communication and control, and
enhancement of ammunition capabilities may produce new concepts which
could aid the small unit in successfully completing its mission. Histor-
ically, considerable effort in research and modeling has been expended
in all these areas except for the area of tactics. Investigation of
tactics has been largely empirically oriented with only limited develop-
ment of formal models to aid tactical decision making. Perhaps the
reasons for less emphasis on research and modeling of tactics than on
improvement of military equipment was reflected in 1953 by L. F.
Richardson. He stated, "Literary people have sometimes wrongly supposed
that mathematical expressions can be used to describe the actions of only
such objects as follow laws of a rigid mechanical, deterministic type in
all particulars." He also cautioned, "Mathematical expressions have,
however, their special tendencies to pervert thought: the definiteness
may be spurious, existing in the equations but not in the phenomena to
be described; and the brevity may be due to the omission of the more
important things, simply because they cannot be mathematized." [24]
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These concepts expressed by Richardson imply that careful mathematical
investigation of a complex subject such as small unit tactics could
yield useful results.
Numerous papers have been published on the art of combat modeling;
however, they generally address casualty prediction or optimal weapon
mixes. Techniques such as Lanchester's equations, Markov processes,
and Monte Carlo simulation have been used in modeling combat. A few
authors, such as Brackney, Schaeffer, and Deitchman, have written about
small unit engagements, but again they seem to approach the situation
from the survivability/casualty concept. [6,23,8] The complexities
surrounding combatants in small unit engagements and the interweaving
of their actions present mathematical challenges which must be tempered
by military and analytical judgment; however, probabilistic and mathemat-
ical investigations of small unit tactics can at least open unknown doors,
The purpose of this thesis is to identify and relate major variables
of small unit infantry combat engagements in such a manner that different
tactical fire and maneuver policies can be studied. The thesis proceeds
by first reviewing general background knowledge in Lanchester Theories of
Combat. Basic tactics are addressed in Chapter IV through explanation of
small unit composition, engagement, and maneuver, and by presentation of
military definitions. Chapter V includes preliminary exposition of the
dynamics of combat engagements and parametric interactions. Then,
starting with Lanchester's Square Law, the model is constructed by incor-
poration of major combat variables into the basic equations. Many of
these variables were found to depend on time and range between opposing
forces. For those variables, functional expressions are developed and
presented in the latter part of Chapter V. The last section of that
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chapter gives the final form of the fire fight model. In Chapter VI
there is an investigation of a small unit in a daylight attack. Additions
to the general model assumptions are made followed by an explanation of
parameter values which came from published research and military statis-
tics. Results of the computer program used to solve the model are then
presented.
Suggested extensions of the model are presented in Chapter VII,
together with a discussion of general model conclusions and output trends.
An appendix contains the computer program and sample output data for the
specific application of the model.
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III. LANCHESTER THEORIES OF COMBAT
The dynamics of modern combat have been modeled by F. W. Lanchester
[14]. Given a situation where concentration of force is possible, Lan-
chester formulated the engagement in attrition of opposing forces by














where A(t) and D(t) are respectively the attacking force and defending
force sizes at time t. C„ and C Q are attrition rate coefficients, and
represent the constant rate at which an individual combatant kills the
opposing force. The state solution of these equations, where force
strength is proportional to the square of the number of combatants enter-
ing the battle, implies the advantages of force concentration. [17]
Lanchester's Square Law (the above equations) is based on the assump-
tion that combatants attack each other in such a manner that each force
may take any enemy unit under fire and may shift fire to another enemy
unit when desired. Other assumptions of his model are that each combat-
ant is within weapon range of all enemy units, forces are composed of
homogenous units, with possibly different force attrition rate coeffi-
cients, location of the enemy is known, and fire distribution is uniform
over surviving forces.
Howard Brackney [6] represented attrition rate coefficients as a
product of the probabilities of kill in individual encounters (p) and the
18
rates at which opposing combatants encounter each other (r), where an
encounter implies one combatant firing one round at an opponent. Using
this notation, Lanchester's model of force concentration in combat becomes
tF -WDM*) d)
and
Solution of these equations implies an interesting property of accelera-
tion of the action toward the end of a battle since the last half of a
force is annihilated quicker than the first. This is caused by the re-
maining members of the opposing force being able to shift their fire and
concentrate on the enemy's destruction.
The usefulness of direct application of Lanchester's Square Law to
small unit combat has been questioned because of the restrictive assump-
tions of the model. [31] Bonder wrote, "Current literature suggests
that the use of Lanchester-type models for prediction of battle results
has been hampered by this inability to predict the attrition rate coeffi-
cients." [5] It is evident that attrition is dependent on more than
the number of firing units and a constant attrition coefficient. Though
the basic assumptions of Lanchester are restrictive, it appears that in-
ferences could be made about real combat situations if variable attrition
rate coefficients dependent on such battle parameters as range, time, and
aiming error could be developed. During the following chapters an attempt
shall be made to identify significant battle parameters and to relate
them to attrition rate coefficients.
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IV. SMALL UNIT TACTICS
Aggressive and decisive action against an enemy to effect total des-
truction of that enemy force is the underlying substance of offensive
combat. Mission, enemy and friendly situations, and terrain, varying from
battle to battle and even being dynamic within each engagement, dictate
a leader's choice of basic tactics in order to meet changing situations.
Hence, this chapter addresses basic definitions and concepts of small
unit tactics in preparation for a mathematical development to model the
action of combat. Tactics and terminology will be based on U.S. Marine
Corps doctrine. [15,33]
In this context a small unit is defined as a unit of fire team,
squad, or platoon size. Each fire team consists of four men; each squad
is based upon three fire teams; a platoon is formed from three squads.
The leaders of squads and platoons are separate from their comprising
units. For the purpose of this paper a fire fight designates more than
just a firing duel at constant range. The fire fight describes the moving,
dynamic combat engagement whereby the offensive small unit attempts to
close with and destroy an enemy in static position firing at at the
advancing force.
Of the several phases of offensive combat, we shall be primarily con-
cerned with the attack phase. This phase begins when an attacking force
crosses a line of departure (LOD), Subsequently, the attackers are forced
to deploy and fire upon the enemy in order to move forward. The LOD is
an imaginary, easily identifiable line perpendicular to the direction of
attack and controlled by friendly forces. Though the final objective of
the attacking force is destruction of the enemy, an intermediate objective
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is movement to an assault position (AP) from which a final assault
into the enemy position can be launched.
If after crossing the line of departure the attacking force is
fired upon, the unit advances by fire and maneuver. When moving, the
attacking force utilizes the cover and concealment provided by the
terrain and protection of supporting fires. When the concept of fire and
maneuver is employed, subunits and individuals within the attacking force
alternate in moving and covering by fire the advance of the others. When
applied to a small unit in a frontal attack the term maneuver may be re-
placed by movement to indicate basic forward movement toward the objective
without employment of envelopment tactics. Movement entails an on-line
combat formation where individuals are basically abreast of one another.
Control of movement of the attacking force is by the unit leader who may
move his men by unit rushes or individual rushes. Each rush forward is
accompanied by support from the remaining individuals or units which
then comprise the base of fire.
Using these foundational definitions and tactical concepts a
mathematical model of small unit offensive combat will be developed in
the next chapter.
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V. FIRE FIGHT MODEL
Underlying any combat engagement is the concept of success. For as
many times as there are battles there exist equally many definitions of
success. This thesis views success from the position of the attacker.
The mission of an attacking force is to destroy the defending force, thus
its primary physical objective is to acquire the defenders 1 position. To
accomplish this, movement of the force to an intermediate objective desig-
nated as the assault position (AP) is necessary. Hence, the attacking
force is to move from a line of departure (LOD) far forward of the enemy
to a previously designated AP which is closer to the defended position.
It is this movement between the LOD and the AP which is to be modeled,
and it is this phase of battle which incorporates offensive fire and man-
euver tactics. The model does not address the final assault situation
where the entire attacking force rises from the AP, on line, and assaults
non-stop into the defenders' position. Therefore, success, in this context,
is acquisition of the intermediate objective (assault position) with
simultaneous infliction of casualties on the defending force. Degrees of
success in battle incorporate aspects of number of enemy casualties,
number of friendly casualties, and the range between forces at the battle
termination if the AP has not been reached.
Preceding the mathematical development of the small unit fire fight
model, the dynamics of the encounter are explained. General parameter
dependencies, model interactions, and a general scenario are presented in
the first section of this chapter to aid organization and coherence of
the analytical model. Section B presents the basic assumptions of the
model. Then Section C develops the general mathematics of the force
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attrition rates. The functional forms of the model parameters are pre-
sented in Section D, with the final mathematical presentation of the fire
fight in Section E.
A. ENGAGEMENT DYNAMICS
The underlying tactical situation of the model is that the engagement
constitutes a small unit, daylight attack against an enemy stationary
defense. The terrain presents no impassable obstacles to the attacking
force, yet provides them with partial defiladed and covered positions when
combatants are in prone positions. The tactics employed are either offen-
sive forward fire and movement (toward the defenders) or static position
fire (used by both sides). The defending force is assumed static and dug
in using available advantages of terrain, cover, and concealment.
Offensive action by the attackers involves two activities: maneuvering
and fire support. The individual attacker is performing one of these
activities at each moment of the battle, and his assignment to one of the
activities depends on the decision of the attacking force commander. All
attackers are assigned to units which comprise the attacking force. These
units are rotated between the two attacking activities during the forward
movement toward the defenders. When attacking combatants are assigned to
provide fire support for the maneuvering attackers they comprise the base
of fire. Movement of the attacking force is thus incremental.
The maneuvering attackers run without firing toward the defending
force a distance determined by tactical policy and then assume a prone
firing posture utilizing available cover and concealment from defenders.
During this movement the base of fire fires on the defending unit, thus
supplying supporting fire for the maneuvering combatants and attriting
the enemy. The base of fire fires from the covered and concealed positions
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which depend upon the terrain and situation, but have no opportunity to
dig in or prepare a firing position. When the maneuvering attackers have
completed their forward movement, assumed a prone position, and have
commenced firing on the defenders, the attackers in the base of fire, or
a fraction thereof, move in like manner to an on-line position with the
former maneuvering attackers. If only a fraction of the original base
of fire now moves in this second movement, the remaining portion plus
the original maneuvering attackers now act as a base of fire. This pro-
cess of fire and maneuver continues incrementally until the entire
attacking force is again abreast. At this time fire and movement toward
the enemy again commences until the desired assault position is reached.
It is noted that movement only to an on-line position is contrary to
standard Marine Corps battle battle drill; however, the present assumptions
enhance the model's mathematical tractability while not seriously altering
the realism of the engagement.
The action of the engagement follows the general tactics presented in
Chapter IV, as modified by the above and following assumptions. The battle
commences at the LOD when the attacking force sends its first maneuvering
combatants forward with simultaneous firing from the base of fire. This
offensive action is met by immediate fire from the defending force. Offen-
sive fire and maneuver is carried on until the assault position is reached.
This general engagement situation is illustrated by Figure 1.
The complexity of interactions in a combat model yields a difficult
web of input parameter dependencies which often become obscured or dis-
carded. [29] However, through careful investigation the major contri-
buting parameters of a combat engagement can explicitly and directly be
brought into a descriptive analytic model., As stated in Chapter III, the






































































Law, yet the realism of combat plainly implies a dependency of this param-
eter on such quantities as range, battle time, and aiming error. The
functional dependencies of attrition rate coefficients open the doors of
parameter interactions, but at the same time yield a rich, more rewarding
combat model
.
As an example of these interactions the rate of advance of a force
would appear to depend upon: 1) the number of units comprising the force;
2) tactical policy; and 3) the time differential between incremental move-
ments of the attacking force units. The rate of fire of a force is itself
dependent upon force size, available ammunition, range to the target,
and speed of advance. Target size and kill rate are directly dependent.
Exposure time is functionally related to both rate of advance and accuracy
of fire -- which is a factor affecting the probability of kill. Though
many human factor variables definitely affect the combat engagement, they
present difficulties of explicit analytic expression- thus according
themselves more to judgmental insertion into the model through values of
input parameters. Hence, most human factor considerations will be implicit
in the model. Such implications will be explained as the mathematical
model is presented.
B. ASSUMPTIONS OF THE MODEL
The model is continuous in that its time-dependent solutions yield
fractional survivors. In actuality casualties are discrete and integer
valued; however, the purpose of the model is to reveal tactical implications,
not specific numerical casualty predictions. Homogeneity of weapons within
and between opposing forces is assumed since the model is cast from an
independent small unit engagement unsupported by indirect fire or direct
fire of other friendly forces. To gain a factor of conservatism, equality
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of military abilities between individuals of opposing forces is assumed
except for increasing the attackers' aiming error to reflect their energy
expenditure during the attack. The general assumptions of fire and move-
ment of the attacking force and the static posture of the defenders have
been explained, as were the characteristics of terrain.
Movement of the attacking force is incremental, and the distance
moved from prone position to prone position by each unit of the attacking
force is termed a rush distance. Tactical policy, dictating these dis-
tances, can keep the rushes constant in length over the entire battle
period, can functionally vary the rush distances, or can randomly select
the incremental distance to move. A portion of the defenders fire at the
up and moving attackers while the remainder fire on those attackers com-
prising the base of fire. During weapon reloading it is assumed that the
individual is not exposed to lethal opposing fire, implying less than
100% of a force is available to fire or available as a target to the
opposing side.
Fire distribution is assumed to be uniformly distributed over the
target area, with the fire being delivered in the aimed mode as opposed
to area type fire which generally accompanies indirect fire support weapons
or immediate action drills against an ambush. Exposed individuals are
assumed to present circular lethal targets; hence, the cumulative circular
normal distribution is used to give the probability of impact within the
target area. A target kill is implied from a target hit. The above
assumptions which are directly related to explicit model parameters will
be more fully explained in the following sections.
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C. GENERALIZED MODEL


















where A(t) and D(t) are the respective force sizes at time t of the
attackers and defenders, and p D r Q and p.r. are the attrition rate coeffi-
cients with p defined as the probability of kill in an individual encounter
and r defined as the rate of encounter. Thus, equation (1) represents
the defending force's (D) action against the attacking force (A); and,
similarly, equation (2) represents A's action against D. The A force
offensive activities are divided into maneuvering and fire support, as
previously stated. Al is defined as the maneuvering combatants and A2 as
the base of fire combatants. The size at time t of Al and A2 is respec-
tively symbolized as Al(t) and A2(t). Al(t) is then the size of Al at
time t and is composed of a command-specified percentage of the entire
A force. This percentage, designated as n» is restricted to a value
whose inverse yields an integer, and this integer, termed u, implies the
total number of units comprising the A force . The number of units in
the base of fire is then dependent upon n- Each such unit is symbolized
as A2. , i - 1 , . . . , (u-1), and its size at time t is represented as
A2.(t), i = 1, ... s (u-1). Therefore the above division of the attacking




u = 1/n , (4)
u-1




A(t) = Al(t) + I A2.(t) , (6)
i=l
n
There is no requirement that Al be an entire homogeneous tactical subunit
such as one fire team, or one squad. Hence, the A force commander may
randomly select individual troops or a unit to comprise Al for any incre-
mental rush toward the objective.
The defending force is divided such that Dl(t) and D2(t) respectively
define the number of defenders assigned to fire at the maneuvering attackers
and the number of defenders assigned to fire at the A2 base of fire units.






D(t) = Dl(t) + D2(t)
, (9)
The need to reload weapons implies that, on the average, a percentage of
each force will not be firing at or attriting the opposition, dud conse-
quently will not be exposing themselves as possible targets. Let y be
the proportion of a force not firing because of reloading or fire
suppression effects. Then, the number of D forces firing at Al is
(l-Y)[Dl(t)] and the number firing at A2 is (l-y)[D2(t)]. Similarly,
since it is assumed that Al does not fire while moving, the number of A
u-1













Each incremental movement forward in the attack of the entire A
force can be envisioned as a time cycle. The length of the cycle is
dependent upon the number of units comprising A, the time (TR) it takes
one unit to move one rush distance, and the coordinating time (TC) between
unit rushes which is necessary for the A force commander to retain control
of his force. For example, if n = 1/3 implying three units of attackers,
then a cycle would be illustrated as in Figure 2, Note that the symbols
Al and A2. , i = 1, ... , (u-1) are just general designations to describe
the A force commander's choice of which combatants to move and which
combatants are to act as the base of fire.
Target size depends on the force and the assigned task. Since target
area is assumed circular, RAD1 designates the radius of the circular
target area equivalent to that presented by an attacker in an up-and-
moving posture, RAD2 is the radius of a circular target area equivalent
to that presented by a prone attacker, and RAD3 represents the radius of
the target area equivalent to that presented by a defender. Since Dl
fires at Al , the running unit, it is assumed that they continue to fire
at the same Al individuals as they take cover after completing the rush
distance and also during the following period of coordinating time until
a new unit assumes the maneuvering task, leaving the base of fire cover






















































Dl shifts its fire to it. Therefore, in terms of rush times and coor-
dinating times, an Al unit presents an RAD1 target to Dl for
TR + TC
per cent of the time and presents an RAD2 target to Dl for
TC
TR + TC
— per cent of the time while it is designated Al
. At any
instant of time the A2. unit presents an RAD2 target to D2 for an expected
time length of (i )(TR + TC) , for i = 1 , . . .
,
(u-1).
The rate of encounter as appearing in equations (1) and (2) is
synonymous with a rate of fire of conventional weapons. For an attacking
force it is reasonable to speak of an individual rate of fire since its
enemy occupies a static position. For the defending force the recipro-










Tf D • (10
where r~ is the rate of fire of the defenders, T ~ is the time it takes
a defender to search for and acquire a target, and Tfn represents the time
required by the defender to execute his attack on an A target or, in
other words, the time required to fire his weapon . Target acquisition
time and firing time are seen to be associated with target cover and con-
cealment. Consequently, an attacker rising from a prone position to move
forward in the open causes the defenders' target acquisition time to be
negligible. On the other hand, if a combatant remains covered and con-
cealed in his base of fire position his opponents' search time is relatively
large in comparison to firing time. Therefore, it is assumed that T -. is
approximately zero if the opposing unit is moving in the open, and that
TfD is negligible if the attacking force is occupying prone, covered,
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and concealed positions. The rate of attack of the A force will hereafter
be termed rate of fire and will be symbolized by ROF.
Let HPD represent the probability that a D combatant is hit and
therefore out of action. The probability that an Al combatant is killed
while running is designated HPA1 , and HPA1, symbolizes the probability
of killing an Al combatant during the TC time units he is prone and
getting ready to fire and before another A unit rushes forward. Let
HPA2., i =1, ...
,
(u-1), represent the probability that a member of
the A2. unit is killed. Sufficient relationships have now been developed
to allow a general expression of the model.
The general fire fight is modeled through expression of force loss
rates as in equations (1) and (2). Now equation (6) stated
u-1
A(t) - Al(t) + I A2.(t)
i = l
n









In the remaining analytical development, quantities which are time
dependent will not be written in functional form unless required for
clarity [i.e., A(t) will be written as A].
The D force will not be decomposed into its subunits Dl and D2 for
the analytical modeling since all defending forces present similar targets
for attrition to the attacking force.
First addressing the rate of encounter parameter, the combination of
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where the factor l/(u-l) represents the proportion of time that the i
unit of the base of fire presents a prone target to the defenders for
(i) • (TR + TC) time units, and where p Q is the probability of D2
i
killing an attacker in the A2. unit. Equations (17) and (18) indicate
that target acquisition time for running targets is negligible and firing
time against covered targets is not considered in relation to the time
it takes to acquire a prone target. The defenders' loss rate becomes
{£ = -(PA )(R0F)[(l-n)A] , (19)
where it is recalled that (1-n) implies only the base of fire combatants
attrite D since Al does not fire while running.
Recalling the relationship of D, Dl , and D2, and the reloading time
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Letting Y represent a summation of the fraction of battle time it takes
to reload and a fraction incorporating human factor time of not exposing
oneself, then (1-y) represents the expected fraction of forces actually
available to fire at any instant of time. The model assumes that y for
defenders and attackers is the same.
Substituting, of the fraction of time an Al combatant presents an
RAD1 target with probability of HPA1 of being killed and the fraction of












Since (1-y) also indicates the fraction of firing combatants exposed at
any instant of time it thereby decreases the probability of kill, and















. [(l-Y)(HPD)](R0F)[(l-Y)(l-n )A] . (25)
Noting that equations (23) and (24) combine to give dA/dt, then in para-
metric form the equations (23), (24), and (25) attempt to describe the
dynamic small unit engagement.
D. FUNCTIONAL FORMS OF THE MODEL PARAMETERS
As explained at the beginning of this chapter, model interactions and
parameter dependencies are numerous. The following sections explain and
illustrate some of these interactions and functional forms of the model
parameters.
1. Hit/Kill Probabilities
In a combat situation a hit effectively kills an attacking combatant
since any wound, lethal or minor, renders the individual's forward move-
ment and further action virtually impossible. A hit on a defender will
probably occur in the chest, shoulder, or head area since he is firing
from a prone or dug-in position and such a hit effectively implies a kill
or serious disablement, This is the basis for the assumption that prob-
ability of kill as applied in Lanchester theory equals single-shot hit
probability. If the impact point of a rifle round is distributed
according to the circular normal distribution with standard deviation






For aiming error functionally expressed in mils and symbolized as a(j),
where j represents target exposure time and for the range between shooter
and target expressed as R, the kill probability becomes,
HP = 1-e L
(30.3) r
(27)






where TR is the time it takes a combatant to move one rush distance or,
in other words, the time he exposes himself as an RAD1 target. The other
kill probabilities -- HPA1, and HPA2. -- are similarly formed.
2. Aiming Error [a(j)]
Aiming error in mils is taken to be dependent upon target exposure
time. [22] Therefore, if a combatant is in the base of fire, he presents
the defenders with an RAD2 target for (u-l)-(TR + TC) • (TR + TC) time
units in each cycle. Aiming error is a monotonically decreasing function
for increasing target exposure time with a(j), the attacking combatants'
error, being greater than the defenders' aiming error for all j. This
disparity of force aiming error is assumed since D is not affected by
any exhaustion factor or ability decrement caused by movement. Since Al
combatants are in up and down modes with the same defenders firing at
them, an average a(TR), or a(TR) where
a(TR) = [(n).a(») + (l-n)-a(TR)]
.
(29)
is used for the aiming error of the defenders firing at the Al combatants..





The D force times for target acquisition and fire are assumed to
be linear, monotonic decreasing functions of total battle time shown in
Figure 3. The times t, and t« are respectively the battle times at which
the attacking force comes within the maximum effective range of the
weapons used by both sides and the time it takes the A force to reach its


















D FORCE TARGET ACQUISITION AND FIRING TIMES
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and TMINF represents the minimum time to fire. The maximum time used in
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The rate of fire of the A force is a linearly decreasing function
illustrated in Figure 4. The times t, and t
?
used in the rate of fire






















A FORCE RATE OF FIRE
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where ROFMAX is the maximum effective rate of fire of the weapon and














The symbols X and BL are explained in the following paragraph.
4. Ammunition (BL, X)
The attacking force lethality is constrained by the amount of
ammunition it can carry. Basic load of ammunition (BL) is the amount each
A combatant can carry. Each attacker is aware he must conserve some
ammunition for the final assault from' AP into D's position. Let the
amount each attacker expends in moving from the LOD to AP be (X)(BL),
where £ X £ 1. No constraint is placed on the amount of aummunition
available to the defenders since, they are given the capability of
previously preparing their defensive posture.
5. Non-Firing/Non-Exposure Factor (y)
The firing rates, ROF, T -, and T™, as presented, do not take
into consideration reloading of weapons, battle field confusion, or
human factors of battle fatigue or fear. Assuming that a parameter y
exists which accounts for these factors of battle, let it equal the summa-
tion of a reloading factor and a fire suppression factor. Let Y r * equal
the fraction of total battle time needed for one combatant to reload, and
assume that a combatant does not present a target when reloading. Then
Y „ implies the fraction of a force not exposed at any instant of time.
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Let
Yf«. equal the fraction of A or D not exposing themselves at any
instant of time due to fire suppression or other intangible human factor
reasons. Then,
Y = Yr£ +Yfs t (34)
6. Rate of Advance (ROA)
A rate of advance (ROA) of the A force is used to calculate t,
and t
?
. This rate is dependent upon tactical policy of movement of
the A force, but for any one rush or incremental movement of the entire
A force, ROA is directly dependent upon TR and TC, the times needed for
one combatant or Al unit to move one rush distance and the coordinating
time between movements of the units of A. Define the time for the entire
A force to move one rush distance as,
TAR = (u)(TR + TC)
, (35)
If the length of a rush distance is symbolized as RD, then
ROA = jgg- , (36)
in distance per unit time.
7. Range
The range (R) between A and D is as,
R(t) = R(0) - (t)(R0A)
, (37)
where R(0) is the range at time zero. Though distance between the u
units of A may vary due to tactical policy, an averaged range based upon
the entire A force rate of advance is used to calculate the force attri-
tion rates.
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E. Fire Fight Model
Bringing together the basic analytical developments of the model in
Section C and the functional forms of the input parameters of Section D,
the final mathematical expression of a small unit engagement with variable
attrition rate coefficients can be written. Leaving the A force decomposed
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It is realized that all the complexities of battle have not been
explicitly addressed, and in Chapter VII proposals for possible exten-
sions of this model are presented. The next chapter uses the above equa-
tions in an investigation of fire and maneuver policies of ninety different
battle simulations, based upon a scenario of a small unit attacking a
static defensive force.
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VI. INVESTIGATION OF FIRE AND MANEUVER POLICIES BY
VARYING FOUR INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
To investigate offensive tactical policies of an attacking infantry
unit, a scenario of a small unit daylight attack against a static defen-
sive force was used. The independent variables were force size, rush
distance length, the number of units composing the attacking force, and
the distribution of the defensive force fire. The combinations of the
variables yielded 90 different battle simulations. The following section
gives the scenario which is an enhancement of the general model situation
presented in Chapter V. Section B of this chapter discusses the nonvari-
ant parameter values of the model, and Section C presents the values of
the independent variables which formed the basis of the tactical fire
and maneuver policy of each battle simulation. Section D then presents
the results of the investigation.
A. SITUATION
The overall engagement situation is that a maneuvering A force
attacks a static D force during daylight hours. It is assumed that before
the battle begins the A force leader receives an operation order to attack
the defended position, has sufficient time to make a reconnaissance of
the objective, and selects the line of departure (LOD) and the final
assault position (AP). Movement of the A force to the LOD does not
involve action from the defender. Once at the LOD, with all attackers
in prone positions, the A force leader commences the attack by sending his
first maneuvering attackers forward accompanied by simultaneous support
from the remaining base of fire. A frontal assault (direct movement
45
toward the enemy) is the basis of the A force tactics. Movement is
carried out by the use of constant rush distances and is affected by the
number of units comprising the A force. Execution of rushes, defending
force posture, and aspects of terrain have been described in Chapter V.
With the scenario specified, the values of the model parameters will now
be addressed.
B. NONVARIANT PARAMETER VALUES
The following paragraphs give the values of parameters which were
held constant during the investigation of tactical policies. The values
used for these model parameters were selected from 1) published research
and field experiments, 2) military statistics, and 3) personal combat
knowledge. Professional military judgment was used to temper any known




The line of departure (LOD) was chosen to be 600 meters from the
defenders' position. At this range, or greater, average rifle fire has
questionable effect; so, generally, a defending force armed with rifles
would not take an opposing force under fire at ranges beyond 600 meters.
The final assault position (AP) was 50 meters in front of the D force.
This range keeps the A force just beyond hand grenade range of D yet is
close enough that the final on-line, non-stop assault through the object-
ive should not falter because of attacker exhaustion.
2. Weapons and Ammunition
As mentioned above, the weapon used by both forces was assumed to
be a semi-automatic, .30 calibre, U.S. rifle such as the M-14. The
maximum effective range for such a weapon was taken to be 450 meters,
where maximum effective range is militarily defined as the range at which
46
a shooter may be expected to fire accurately. [13] However, kills at
ranges greater than 450 meters were assumed possible. Although more than
twice the load specified by military doctrine, a basic load of ammunition
(BL) of 300 rounds per attacker was used. [13] Recent combat experience
caused this departure from the written specification. Realizing that
conservation of ammunition is a necessity so that the final assault can
be carried through, the fraction (a) of the basic load of ammunition
expended by a combatant in the attack, was given a value of 2/3. Although
once a force commences an attack it is virtually impossible for the
attacking force leader to completely control the force's fire, the fact
still remains that each attacker realizes he must conserve some ammuni-
tion since resupply in such an attack is impossible. Therefore, setting
X = 2/3 provides 1/3 of a basic load, or 100 rounds, for the final
assault.
3. Target Exposure, Rush, and Coordinating Times
A value of ten seconds was selected for the coordinating time (TC)
between rushes to allow the attacking force leader time to decide which
combatants to send forward on the next rush. Times longer than ten seconds
were not used since they caused the computer battle simulations using a
rush distance of five meters to be of excessive length. Corresponding to
rush distances of 5, 10, 20, 30, and 40 meters, the target exposure times
used were 1.8, 2,8, 4.6, 6.0, and 7.7 seconds. [22] These times
correspond to values experimentally obtained by clocking the times needed
for a man to rise from a prone position, run the specified distance, and
assume another prone position. The times recorded were those clocked
between the time the rusher first appeared in view of the observer and the
time when the rusher disappeared from view errain and foliage
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these times were slightly shorter than the actual time it took the
rusher to move the specified distance. Hence, times to move one rush
distance were assumed equal to target exposure times plus one second.
This one second addition was assumed to be the time an attacker is moving
but not fully seen during each rush.
4. Rates of Fire
The maximum rate of fire of the attacker was taken as 40 rounds
per minute, which is the sustained rate of fire of the M-14 rifle. [13]
The minimum times to fire and acquire targets by the D force were also
taken to correspond to 40 rounds per minute. The maximum time required
for a defender to fire his rifle was chosen as 0.059 minutes, which
implies 17 rounds per minute. The maximum time for a D force combatant
to acquire a target was selected as 0,16 minutes which corresponds to
approximately 6 rounds per minute. [10]
5. Aiming Error
Figure 5 shows an assumed relationship between aiming error and
target exposure time. The curves are based upon rifle range data reported
by T. E. Sterne and K. L. Yudowitch in 1955. [22] The curves were modi-
fied to the extent that the defenders' combat, steady-state aiming error
is approximately three times greater than the range values. A factor of
three seemed reasonably conservative, yet sufficiently real to account for
battlefield conditions of excitement and fire suppression. The 10 mil
steady-state error for a defender also corresponds to data from rifle
range experiments. These experiments found that a 10 mil error corre-
sponds to a poor rifle range shooter [3,23]. A comparison of a poor
rifle range shooter to an average combat shooter seemed acceptable. For
steady-state aiming error of assaulters, a 20% exhaustion factor was









AIMING ERROR vs TARGET EXPOSURE TIME
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a(°°) of attackers equals 12 mils. As the length of target exposure time
decreases, rifle range situations come closer to approximating combat
situations. Firing at a target exposed for one or one and one-half
seconds is basically a reaction instead of a conscious rifle movement
and thus there is little difference at such exposure times between rifle
range and combat conditions.
6. Reloading and Non-Exposure Factors
Since force rates of fire do not take into consideration reloading
of weapons and fire suppression, a factor incorporating these effects was
introduced into the model in Chapter V. This factor was symbolized as v
and was set equal to the summation of a reloading factor and a fire sup-
pression factor.
The reloading factor {y Q ) is defined as the fraction of total
battle time used by one combatant to reload. Assuming that a combatant
is not a visible target when he is reloading, then y also represents a
fraction of the total battle time a shooter is not exposed. A parameter
value for y was obtained from the following assumptions. Let it be
i X/
assumed it takes six seconds to load a magazine into a rifle [22] and
that each combatant has five magazines (one magazine in his rifle and
four magazines on his cartridge belt). This implies it will take 24
seconds to load the four remaining magazines into the rifle. Now let 200
available rounds of ammunition [(x)(BL) = 2/3(300) = (200)] be distri-
buted such that 20 rounds are in each of the five magazines carried by a
combatant (i.e., 100 rounds loaded in magazines) and that 100 rounds are
in bandolier ammunition (five rounds per clip). This bandolier ammuni-
tion is made so that a magazine can be loaded while still in a weapon,
but it is a slower process than just reloading a rifle directly with a
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full 20-round magazine. Assuming that it takes 20 seconds to fill a
magazine using five-round bandolier clips, then loading the 100 rounds
of bandolier ammunition into magazines will take 100 seconds. Given
each combatant begins the engagement with a full magazine in his rifle,
let it be assumed that a combatant will load four magazines into his
rifle. When he has expended the rounds from his last magazine, it is
assumed he will fill that magazine (the one in the rifle) using five-
round bandolier clips. Such a loading procedure of magazines into a
rifle and of bandolier ammunition into a magazine (in the rifle) implies
a total time of approximately two minutes to reload. Therefore, y
equals the time needed to reload A"BL rounds (i.e., two minutes) divided
by battle time (the length of time it takes the A force to move from the
L0D to the AP).
The effect of battle field fire suppression is accounted for by a
factor symbolized as y- . This factor is defined as the fraction of A
and D forces not exposing themselves at any instant of time due to fire
suppression. A value of 0.15 was chosen for y. . This value was
selected so that the maximum value of v = y „ + y£ would be 0.50.m fs
A 0.50 value for the y factor was placed as an upper limit since it is
a close estimate for the reloading factor needed by a fire team with an
automatic rifle, where one man of the four must constantly be loading




As stated in Chapter V, target size depends on the force and the
combatants' assigned tasks. Also it was assumed that circular target
area is equivalent to the area presented by a combatant, For a combatant
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in a prone position and in the attacking force, the radius of the assumed
circular target presented by the attacker was taken to be 7,0 inches, [29]
For a defender (assumed in a prepared defensive area) a radius of 4.95
inches was used for the radius of a circular target area equivalent to
that area presented by a defensive force combatant. [29] For a maneuvering
attacker the value 15.2 inches was used for the radius of the circular
area equivalent to the area presented by the moving combatant. [7]
All of the above parameter values supply the necessary information
to completely evaluate all remaining model variables, except for the in-
dependent variables of force size, rush distance, number of units in A,
and D force fire distribution which will be specified in the following
section.
C. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES OF BATTLE SIMULATIONS
The values of the independent variables used in the battle simulations
are given in the following paragraphs. For each battle there was speci-
fied a force size for A and D, a number of units composing A, a rush dis-




The tactical offensive policy used in each computer battle simulation
was based on constant rush distance and the number of units comprising the
A force. The values used for rush distance were 5, 10, 20, 30, and 40
meters. Rush distance of less than 5 meters was considered impractical
since such distances imply an excessively slow rate of advance. Rush
distances greater than 40 meters were considered unrealistic in combat
because of the weight of equipment carried into battle by each combatant.
2. Number of Units in Attacking Force
The values used for the fraction ( n ) of A forces assigned to maneuver
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were 1/5, 1/3, and 1/2. The reciprocal of n is the number of units (u)
comprising the attacking force. Therefore the values of u were 5, 3,
and 2.
3. Force Size
The attacking force size was set at twelve men for the first 45
battle simulations. Another 45 different battle simulations used a value
of 24 for the attacking force size. The force size of the D force was
set at four combatants for all engagement simulations.
4. Defensive Fire Distribution
Fire distribution of the defensive force was varied so that the
fraction of defenders firing on the maneuvering attackers took on values
of 0.1, 0.5, and 0.9. Although values of 0.1, and 0.9 for defensive fire
distribution represent extreme situations, such values were chosen so
comparison of offensive tactical policies and defensive enemy fire could
cover a wide spectrum of possible defensive fire tactics.
D. RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION OF TACTICAL POLICIES
A computer program (in Appendix A) used the parameter values of Section
B and the independent variable values of Section C to generate the end of
battle data displayed in Tables 1 through 6. Each row in the tables
illustrates the data of a specific battle. Difference between battles
occurred from varying force size, rush distance (RD), number of units (u)
comprising A, and the distribution of D's fire.
The computer program updated battle data every tenth of a minute
during the engagement and recorded the status of the battle at ewery 50
meters of advance of the attacking force. If either force was annihilated
before a new 50 meter distance was traversed, the program recorded the
battle statistics at the time of annihilation. Given 1) a rush distance,
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2) the number of units comprising the A force, and 3) the fire distribution
of the defenders, the number of survivors of each force together with the
range between forces at the end of the battle and the length of the battle
in minutes can be read from the tables on the following pages. The symbols
in the column titled VICTOR, in all tables, represent either 1) the
force which annihilated its opponents before the attacking force reached
the assault position or 2) the force with the greatest number of survivors
when the range at the end of the battle was 50 meters (i.e,, the attacking
force reached the AP).
It is most interesting to note in Tables 1, 2, and 3 that the attacking
force was only victorious when the defensive fire was distributed with
only one-tenth of the defending force firing at the up and moving attackers
(p = 0.1). Even with this distribution of defending force fire the
attackers were not victorious for all tactical policies employed (rush
distance combined with the number of units in A). Fo A a rush distance
of 5 meters, in combination with all values for the number of units in
A, the attacking force was annihilated at or before a range of 100 meters.
During such battles, the defenders never lost more than 50% of their own
force. For all values of u (number of units in A) when enemy fire was
distributed with p = 0.1, rush distances of 20, 30, and 40 meters yielded
higher degrees of battle success (more surviving attackers, fewer sur-
viving defenders, and proximity to the AP) than the shorter RD's of
10 and 5 meters. Against an enemy fire distribution of p - 0.1 the
results showed that 1) a 12-man attacking force of 3 or 5 units should
move in 30 and 40 meter rushes and 2) a 12-man attacking force of 2 units
could attain approximately the same degree of battle success by rushing
in 20 meter increments as they could by employing 30 and 40 meter rush tactics
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TABLE 1
END CF BATTLE RESULTS WHERE
DEFENSIVE FIRE IS DISTRIBUTED AS RHO =
AND A FORCE = 12 , D FORCE = 4
ETA = 1/5 RHO = C.l
ATTACK DEFEND RANGE(WET) BATTLE
RD SI'RVIV SURVIV VICTOR END BATTLE LENGTH(M)
4C 7.22 C A 35 20.1
3C 6.19 A BO 24.5
20 2.44 A 65 34.9
10 C 2.47 D 115 55.6
5 C 3.34 D 170 94.1
ETA = 1/3 RHC = C.l
ATTACK DEFEND RANGE(MET) BATTLE
RD SLRVIV SURVIV VICTOR END BATTLE LENGTH(M)
40 P. 68 A 70 12.45P e.24 C A 75 14.9
6.74 C A 75 20.5
C C 1.20 70 36.7
5 C 2.84 D 125 60.9
ETA = 1/2 RHO = C.l
ATTACK DEFEND RANGE (MET) BATTLE
00 SURVIV SURVIV VICTOR END BATTLE LENGTH (M)
4C 7.<57 1.05 A 50 8.6
30 7.74 C.37 4 50 10.4
20 7.42 C A 60 14.1
10 1.50 C.3B A 5u 25.4
5 C 2.58 D 100 43.0
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TABLE 2
FNO CF RATTLE RESULTS WHERE
DEFENSIVE FIRE IS DISTRIBUTED AS RHO
AND A FORCE = 12, D FORCE = A.
= 0.5
ETA = 1/5 RHT = ( .5
ATTACK DEFENC RANGE (MET) BATTLE
PD SLRVIV SURVIV VICTOR END BATTLE LENGTH (M)
AC C 2.,71 P 11C 19,
30 r 2,,87 6 125 22,,4
2C c 3.,18 D 150 29, 3
1C c 3,,50 D 13 5 47,,7
c C 3.,74 D 225 79,,5







































































END CF BATTLE RESULTS WHERE
DEFENSIVE FIRE IS DISTRIBUTED AS RHO = 0.9
AND A FORCE = 12 , D FORCE = 4
ETA = 1/5 RHC = C.9
ATTACK DEFEND RANGE(MET) BATTLE
RO SURVIV SURVIV VICTOR END BATTLE LENGTH(M)
4G C 3.44 D 160 17.0
30 C 3.51 D 175 20.0
2G C 3.62 D 200 26.0
10 C 3.7^ 230 42.0
5 C 3.8 8 D 270 70.5







































ETA = 1/2 RHO = 0.9
ATTACK DEFEND RANGE(MET) BATTLE
RD SLRVIV SURVIV VICTOR END BATTLE LENGTH(MJ
40 C 2.83 D 60 8.3
30 C 2.95 D 80 9.8
20 C 3.07 D 100 13.0
1C C 3.40 D 140 21.3
5 C 3.65 D 175 36.0
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When the enemy fire distribution factor p was increased to 0.5 and
to 0.9, the defenders proved to be victorious in all battles against a
12-man attacking force regardless of tactical policies employed by the
attackers. Although 12 attackers were never victorious under the increased
enemy fire distribution factors, higher degrees of attacking force
success were achieved by forces comprised of 2 and 3 units using rush
distances of 30 and 40 meters than for other tactical policies. For
p = 0.5 an offensive tactical policy of u equal to 2 and RD equal to 40
proved best when considering the number of attacking survivors, and
acquisition of the AP. However, it should be noted that the greatest
number of defenders were killed when the tactical policy incorporating
u equal to 3 and RD's equal to 30 and 40 meters was employed against an
enemy fire distribution of p = 0.5.
When nine-tenths of the defenders (p = 0.9) were assigned to fire
on the moving attackers of a 12-man attacking force , the defending sur-
vivor statistics varied only slightly for all offensive tactical policies.
Although defending survivor numbers were generally equal, tactical policies
using u equal to 2 and RD equal 30 and 40 allowed the 12-man attacking
force to move most of the way to the assault position-
The computer program was run a second time using an attacking force
size of 24 men. All other model input parameter values were identical
to those in the first program. The data for these battles are presented
in Tables 4, 5, and 6. In all battles (except four cases when p = 0.9)
the attacking force was victorious . Where one- tenth of the enemy fire
was distributed against the up and moving attackers, the attacking force
achieved its greatest success by using tactical policies incorporating u
equal to 3 and 5 and RD equal to 30 and 40 meters Success for battles
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TABLE 4
FND CF BATTLE RESULTS WHERE
DEFENSIVE FIRE IS DISTRIBUTED AS RHO















































































ETA = 1/2 PHO =0.1
ATTACK DEFEND RANGE(MET) BATTLE
RD SLPVIV SURVIV VICTOR END BATTLE LENGTH(M)
40 22.4 A 65 8.3
30 22.3 A 85 9.7
20 22.
C
A 10 5 12.9
10 2C.7 A 11C 22.5
5 18. A 110 41.6
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TABLE 5
END OF BATTLE RESULTS WHERF
OFFENSIVE FIRE IS DISTRIBUTED AS *HO = J
AND A FORCE = 2A , D FORCE = A













































































































FND OF BATTLE RESULTS WHERE
DEFENSIVE FIRE IS DISTRIBUTED AS RHO
AND A FORCE = 24 , D FORCE = 4
= 0.9




















































































































incorporating these tactics was considered greater than battles incor-
porating other tactics since the enemy was annihilated at greater ranges.
For enemy fire distribution of p = 0,5 and 0.9, the attackers achieved
their greatest success by employing the tactics of u equal to 3 units
and RD equal to 30 or 40 meters.
The computer program printed out battle data as shown by the example
in Appendix A, and from these results it was noted that single-shot hit
probability increased by a factor of approximately 3 for all targets when
the range to the target became less than 100 meters. It was also noted
that the attacking force rate of fire was extremely low when rush distances
of 5 meters were employed. Conclusions concerning the results of the
simulations appear in the following chapter.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND EXTENSIONS
In this chapter general conclusions are made concerning the results
presented in Chapter VI. Following the conclusions, suggestions are
given for extension and enrichment of the model.
It was noted in Chapter VI that when the twelve-man attacking force
used a five meter rush distance they were annihilated. It appears that
this type of movement resulted in an excessively slow rate of advance for
the attackers, thereby allowing the defenders to expend a great number of
rounds in effort to kill the attacking combatants. Also, this slow rate
of advance dictated an extremely low rate of fire (less than ten rounds
per minute in all cases) for the attackers. The low rate of fire hindered
the attackers' destruction of the enemy. It does not seem realistic that
a force would continue the attack, taking a great number of casualties,
without increasing their rate of fire above the restrictions imposed by
the fire fight model assumptions. The attacking force rates of fire,
during battles incorporating rush distances greater than five meters,
seemed reasonable.
Considering all distributions of enemy fire for the given force sizes,
the study suggested that rush distances of 30 and 40 meters were of
greater tactical advantage to the attacker than were lesser RD lengths.
The only exception to this trend was that the 20 meter rush, in connection
with 2 units comprising the A force, produced approximately the same degree
of battle success for the attacking force as did the RD's of 30 and 40
meters which were combined with 2 and 3 units in the A force. The results
also implied that an A force composed of 2 or 3 units was generally more
successful than a 5 unit attacking force. The only exception to this
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conclusion was a 5 unit A force which employed a rush distance of 40
meters against an enemy fire distribution of p - 0.1. In this case the
attackers achieved approximately the same degree of battle success as
did other tactical policy combinations against the same type defensive
fires. These general conclusions give support, at the small unit level,
to the Marine Corps doctrine of triangular force structure. The results
of the study do deviate from Marine Corps battle drill tactics of using
rush distance lengths of 5 to 10 meters. [33] Perhaps this deviation
of optimal rush length (30 to 40 meters suggested by this study versus
5 to 10 meters suggested by the Marine Corps) stems from the total dis-
tance (550 meters) over which the battles in this study were fought.
This large variance of results does, however, give reason for continued
research and modeling of small unit fire and maneuver tactics.
The development and testing of the fire fight model have indicated
areas for future study and analysis which could yield additional insights
into the field of small unit tactics. As a first extension of this thesis
it is suggested that further application of the model could be made by
analyzing additional fire and maneuver policies. The only tactical policy
studied in this thesis was that of constant rush distance combined with
varying the number of units comprising the attacking force. Other rush
distance policies could be analyzed to see which policy yields the great-
est degree of success- Additional fire and maneuver tactics which could
be studied are 1) rush distances which decrease linearly as the range to
the objective decreases, or 2) rush distances which are varied logarith-
mically with range. Following a logarithmic change of rush distance the
attacking force could use either the tactic of long rush distances for the
majority of the battle with short rushes used over the last 100 or 200
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meters or a policy of beginning with long RD's and then quickly changing
to the shorter rush distances for the majority of the advance. Studies
incorporating these ideas would entail the modification of the computer
program presented in Appendix A but would not require mathematical altera-
tion of the model
.
Enhancement of the model analytically can take many forms for it
is indeed rare that modeling of human decision processes and combat
dynamics could ever be completed. Stamina was not addressed explicitly
in model, yet the performance of an attacking combatant decreases steadily
in many areas as he continues to move. [16] This energy expenditure
factor was implicit in the model since rush distances of greater than 40
meters were not tested. Larger RD's than 40 meters were not used since
it was felt that the average combatant, carrying a weapon, body armor, and
ammunition, could not continue to rush in increments greater than 40 meters
over the entire distance between the LOD and AP. However, direct inclu-
sion of a combatant's performance decrement could enrich the model. The
psychological breakpoint of a force [21] could also be included since
the number of casualties taken by a force could easily effect its perform-
ance. This unit performance variable suggests relations with other parameters
such as surrender factors, dessertion rates, and morale coefficients.
[23,34] Employment of supporting weapons such as mortars or artillery
would be another realistic extension of the fire fight model. In connection
with model extensions additional effort might be given to estimation of
parameter values. Combat data for parameter estimation is almost impossible
to obtain, however if the researcher is not bound by security classifi-
cation, restricted documents do exist which might aid the modeling of
combat situations. [19,30]
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Schoderbek suggested that the effect of increased intelligence about
an opposing force's position can be simulated by permitting the single-
shot kill probabilities to be non-decreasing functions of time, [26]
The kill probability functions used in this study incorporated this aspect
since they were non-decreasing functions and were dependent upon time.
This dependency on time resulted from the kill probabilities being
directly dependent on range, where range was dependent upon the rate of
advance of the attacking force,,
In this thesis the major combat variables have been explored and
related in effort to realistically model the small unit infantry battle.
Interesting results of the fire fight model application were obtained
giving implications that increasing rush distance length might improve
success in combat. The author does not imply that present tactics can
or should be changed based on the results of this study or other present
models of combat engagements , However, it is strongly felt that modeling
of military tactics could produce interesting results which might aid the
combat commander in his decision-making process., As a final caution
to those undertaking research and modeling of military tactics the
following quote is offered.
"If ever there was a world in which situations do not
repeat themselves like some mass production model, it
is the military world. If we are to avoid the imposition
of arbitrary limits to the exercise of judgment and con-
trol, let us be careful not to create in a mathematical
vacuum situations which are based neither on past exper-
ience of affairs, nor on any conception of the innumerable
variables and factors that determine social decision
either today or tomorrow. The human brain, human values,
human judgments, are still superior to the mechanics and
processes of electronic computers or guidance systems.
The day this ceases to be true there will probably be no
human brains. But until then, let us use true scientific
method as an aid to human judgment, and not as a hindrance.
Science inhuman experience; it is not an alternative to
judgments, and it is certainly not something that can
operate outside human experience,," [28]
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APPENDIX A
Computer Program for a Daylight Attack
With Constant Rush Distance
This computer program is written in FORTRAN IV language for the
IBM 360 series computer. Preceding the main program is a list of
variables and their definitions. Following the main program are six
function subprograms. The last two pages of this appendix present
sample output data generated by the program for each battle analyzed
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C THI* COMPUTER PROGRAM EVALUATES A DAYLIGHT ASSAULT
C OF AN INFANTRY RIFLE SQUAD AGAINST AN ENTRENCHED
C ENEMY FIRE TEAM USING A CONTINUOUS MODEL BASED ON
C THE LANCHESTER THEORIES OF COMBAT.
C
C
C THE SYMBOLS USED IN THE PROGRAM ARE DEFINED AS FOLLOWS
C
C RO = LINE OF DEPARTURE
C AP = ASSAULT POSITION
C T = STARTING TIME
C AC = A FORCE INITIAL SIZE
C DO = D FORCE INITIAL SIZE
C ETA = FRACTION OF A FORCE RUNNING
C RHO = FRACTION OF D FORCE FIRING ON RUNNING A FORCES
C U = NUMRER OF A FORCE UNITS
C GAMMA = FRAC T ION OF COMBATANTS NOT EXPOSFO
C .AND NOT FIRING.
C RD = PL^H DI STANCE
C TR = TIME PER PUSH DISTANCE PEP MAN
C TE = EXPOSURE TIME
C TC = COORDINATING TIME
C TAP = TIME PER RUSH DISTANCE FOR THE A FORCE
C ROA = RATE OF ADVANCE
C TMAXF = VAX. TIME TO FIRE, D FORCE
C TMINF = MIN. TIME TO FIRE, FORCE
C TMAXA = MAX. TIME TO ACQUIRE A TGT., D FnpCE
C TMINA = min. TIME TO ACQUIRE A TGT., D c ORCE
C ROFMAX = MAX. RATE OF FIRE, A FCRCE
C ROFMIN = PIN. RATE OF FIRE, A FCRCE
C BL = BASIC LCAD OF AMMUNITION
C LAMDA = FRACTION OF BL USED IN <=IRF AND MANEUVER
C AE1 = AVERAGED AIMING ERROR
C AE2 = AIMING EPRCR(TF + TC
)
C AE3 = AIMING ERROR (2CTE+TCI)
C Tl = TIME FOR A FORCE TC MOVE INTO MAXIMUM EFFFCTIVE
C WEAPON RANGE.
C T2 = TIME FOR A FORCE TO MOVE TO AP
C
C
C DATA USED IN GENERATING COMPUTFR OUTPUT LOCATED AT FND
C OF THE PROGRAM.
MAIN PROGRAM
IMPLICIT REAL*8(A-H,0-Z) , INTEGFR(I-N)
REAL** RKLDEQ,S
PEAL*S LAMDA




READ(5,1C1) TMA XA, TMI NA,TMAX F,TM INF, RO,AP,BL, LAMDA,
*A0, DO, ROFMAX
1C1 F0PMAT(4F15.3)
DIMENSION RD(5) ,TR(5) ,ETA(3) , RHO (3 ) ,TE ( 5
)
C RUSH DISTANCE AND THE TIME TO COVER THIS DISTANCE
C ARE NOW READ INTO THE PROGRAM. RD = 40 , 30 , 20 , 10 ,
5
C AND TR = 8.7,7.0,5.6,3.8,2.8 SEC. . ALSO TARGET
C EXPOSURF TIMES ARE READ WHERE TE = 7.7,6.0,4.6,2.8,1.8
68
READ (5,102) (RD(I) ,1=1,5) ,{TR( J),J=1,5), <TE(M),M=l f 5)
102 FORMAT(5F12.7)
C THE VALUES USED FOR ETA = 0.200,0.333,0.5000 AND
C RHO = 0. 100, C. 500, 0.900 .







TR( I) = TR(I )/60. DO
TE< I) = TE(I)/60.D0
10 CONTINUF
C CALCULATION CF VARIABLES NOT DEPENDENT ON THE
C INDEPENDENT TIME VARIABLE WHICH IS INCREMENTED
C DUPING THE SOLUTION OF THE DIFFERENTIAL EQUATIONS.
C THE DC LOOO VARIABLE I CHANGES RUSH DISTANCE (RD)
C AND RUSH TIME(TR). THE VARIABLE K ROTATES THE
C PARAMETER ETA WHICH IS THE FRACTION OF A FORCES




TAR = U*(TR(I) + TC)
ROA = RDm/TAP
T1=(PO-450.00) /ROA
T2 = (PC - AP) /POA
ROFMIN = (2.00*LAMDA*BL - P0FMAX*(T2-T 1 ))/ <T2 Tl)
IF(ROFMIN) 301,302,302
3C1 ROFMIN = O.DO
3C2 CONTINUE
GRL = 2.DG/UR0 - AP)/ROA)
GAMMA = GRL 0.15D0
AE1 = (AIMERRUOC0))*ETA(K) f 1.DO-ETA (KM*
*AIMERP(TE(I) )
AUG2 = TE(T) TC
AE2 = AIMERRUUG2)
AUG3 = 2.D0*(TE(I) TC)
AE3 = AIMERR(AUG3)
AE^=12.DC
C THE FOLLOWING CARDS INITIALIZE AND CALL THE RKLDEO
C SUBPROGRAM WHICH USES THE RUNGE-KUTT A-GILL FOURTH-
C ORDER METHOD FOR SOLUTION OF A SYSTEM OF NUN THIS
C PROGPAM N=2) FIRST-ORDER ORDINARY DIFFERENTIAL
C EQUATIONS. THE DC LOOP VARIABLE L CHANGES THE
C VALUES CF RHC, THE FRACTION OF FORCES FIRING ON















2^1 CnDUlTI II K//////KV ITMDIIT n AT A A KinCI FOPMATf '1 ',//////15X, 'INPUT OATA ANO COMPUTED',
1* VARIABLE CCNSTANTS'/////15X,'LINE OF DEPARTURE = ',
AF8.1//15X, "ASSMJLT POSITION = ' , F8 . 1/ /15X
,
B 'STARTING TIMEfMIN. » = ',
2F10.8//1 C X, 'A FORCE INITIAL SIZE =
•
, F15 .8// 15X,
3'D »=ORCF INITIAL SIZE = • ,F 15.8//15X , «ET A = • , F 13. 8// 15X
4,'RHC =',F13.8//15X, 'NUMBER OF A UNITS =
'




,F13.8 //15X , • AI MING ERROR ( AVG) =
'
,
5F13.8//15X, 'AIMING ERROR(TE+TC> =• ,F13 .8// 15X , • A IM INO'
6' ERPCP<2<TE*TC )) = ,F13.8//15X , 'T 1 =',F15.8)
WP!TE(6,25l) T2
251 FORMAT! //15X,'T2 =»,F15.8)
WPITE(6,2C5)
2C5 FORMAT( '1', ////////////)
WRITE(6,2G6) RDU) ,ETA(K) ,RHO(L)
2C6 FORMAT(35X,'RD = • ,F5 . 1 ,4X , ' ETA =• , F6 .3 ,4X , ' PHQ =',«=6.3
*)
WPITP(6,2C2)
202 FORMAT* //10X, 'BATTLE • ,3X ,' ATTACK «,3X ,' DEFEND' , 3X ,' RAN'
l'GE',4X, 'HIT PPOB' ,3X, 'HIT PROB
•
,3X , »H IT PROS', 3X,
2'TAD' ,5X, 'TF0S5X, »ROF '/10X , * ( MIN. ) • ,3X , 'SURV IV , 3X,3'SUPVIV ,3X, 'TO TGT',3X,'TGT = 0',*X,'TGT = A1',3X,
4'TGT =A23'//)
C THE FOLLOWING VARIABLES APE CALCULATED TO SIMOLIFY
C THE DIFFERENTIAL EQUATIONS.
1 CONTINUE
TFDX = TFD(T,Ti ,T2,TMAXF,TMINF)
TADX = TAD(T,T1 ,T2,TMAXA t TMINA)
RX = R(T,ROA ,R0)
ROFX = R0F(T,T1 ,T2,R0PMAX f RCFMIN)
C THE FOLLOWING CARDS ARE THE COMBAT MODEL DIFFERENTIAL
C EQUATIONS. Y<1) AND Y(2) ARE THE A FORCE AND D FORCF
C SI7ES RESPECTIVELY AT ANY INSTANT OF TIMEfTIME IS
C INCREMENTED BY 0.1 MIN.) HENCE F(l) AND F(2) REPRESENT
C THE ATTPITION RATES OF A AND D FORCES RESPECTIVELY.
C NOTE THAT CARDS 4-7 APE NOT EXACT RESTATEMENTS OF THE
C A2 LOSS PATE, HOWEVEP SINCE TC = 10 THE APPROXIMATION
C IS EXACT FOR COMPUTATIONS.
«=( 1)=-(<TR(I )/(TR(I)+TC) )*(1.DC - OEXPC-C (30.300*
1RAD1)/(AE1*PX))**2)) + ( TC MTR ( I )+TC ) ) * < 1. 00 -
2DEXP(-( <30.3D0*RAD2)/(AE1*RX) )**2) ) )*< l.DO - GAMMA)*
3RHO(L)*Y(2)/TFDX -
4< (l.D0/(U-l.DO) )*( U.DC-GAMMA)**2)*(1.D0-RH0(L) )*Y(2)
5*(l.D0-DEXP(-( <30.3*RAD2)/(AE2*RX) )**2) )/TADX) -
6((1.D0 - l.DO/UJ-l.DO) )*<U.D0-GAMMA)**2)*(1.D0-RH0(L)
7)*Y<2)*( l.DO-DEXP(-( (30.3*RAD2) t ( AE3*RX ) )**2 ) )/T ADX
)
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F(2)=-( (( 1. DC-GAMMA
>
**2)*R0FX*(1. DO -ET A (K) )*(Y(1))*(1.





203 F0PMAT( J 1»,1X///«ERR0R STOP 1 )
STOP
2 CONTINUE
HPD =(1.DC - DEXP(-n30.3D0*RA03)/<AE**RXM**2)l
HPA1 =(1.00 - OEXP(-( (3G.3D0*RA01)/(AE1*RX) )**2)
)
HPA23=(1.D0 - DEXP(-( (30.3 D0*RAC2) / ( AE3*RX ) )**2) )
IF( (Y( 1).L T .0.D0).0R. (Y(2).LT.C.D0) I GO TO 400
C PRINTED OUTPUT OCCURS AT 50 METER RANGF INCREMENTS. IF
C EITHER FORCE SIZE IS CALCULATED TO BE LESS TH4N OR
C EQUAL TO ZERO THE BATTLE IS TERMINATED.
IF(RX.LE.YY) GO TO 400
GO TO 1
400 WRITE(6,204) T, Y( 1 )
,
Y(2) ,RX ,HPD ,HPA1 ,HPA23 ,T ADX,TFDX,
ROFX
2C4 PORMAK 1CX,F6. 2 ,3X ,F6.
2
,3X ,F6.2 ,3X , F5. 1 ,«X , F8 .5, 3X,
*F8.5,3X,Fe.5,3X,F5.3,3X,F5.3,3X,F4.1)
IF( ( Y( 1).LT.C.D0).0R. (
Y
(2) . LT.O .DO ) ) GO TO 50
YY = YY -50. DO






C THE FOLLOWING FUNCTION CALCULATES THE RANGE
C BETWEEN ATTACKER AND OEFENOER.





C THE FOLLOWING FUNCTION PRODUCES THE TIME D FORCE
C COMBATANTS REQUIRE TO FIRE THEIR WEAPONS.
REAL FUNCTION TFD*8( T , Tl , T2 , TMAXF ,TMI NF)
IMPLICIT REAL*8(A-H,0-Z)
IF(T.LT.Tl) GO TO 1
IF(T.GE.T1.AND.T.LT.T2> GO TO 2
TFD = TMINF
GO TO 3
1 TFD = TMAXF
GO TO 3
2 TFD = TMAXF
3 RETURN
END
- ((TMAXF - TMINF)/(T2-T1))*(T-T1>
C THE FOLLOWING FUNCTION YIELDS TARGET ACQUISITION
C TIME FOR D FORCES.
REAL FUNCTION TAD*8( T ,Ti , T2, TMAXA, TMINA )
IMPLICIT REAL*8(A-H,0-Z)
IF(T.LT.Tl) GO TO 1
IF(T.GE.T1.AND.T.LT.T2) GO TO 2
TAD = TMINA
GO TO 3
1 TAD = TMAXA
GO TO 3




C THE FOLLOWING FUNCTION COMPUTES THE RATE OF FIRE
C OF THE A FORCEStROUNDS PER MIN.)
REAL FUNCTION ROF*8< T,T1 , T2t ROFMAX ,ROFMI N)
IMPLICIT REAL*8(A-H,0-Z)
IF(T.LT.Tl) GO TO 1
IF((T.LT.T2).AND.(T.GE.T1)) GO TO 2
IF(T.GT.T2) GO TO 3
1 ROF = ROFMIN
GO TO A
2 TX = T2 -Tl
IF(TX.GT.IO.DO) GO TO 10
GO TO 22
10 RF = AOO.DO/TX
ROF = RF*(T - T1)/(T2 - Tl)
GO TO A
22 ROF = ROFMIN (ROFMAX - ROFM IN ) *( T-T 1 )/ ( T2-T 1
)
GO TO A
3 ROF = ROFMAX
A RETURN
END
C THE FOLLOWING FUNCTION YIELDS THE VALUE OF RIFLE
C AIMING ERROR/RADIAL DISPERSION OF ROUNDSC MILS )
.












IF(AUG.GE.X) GO TO 1
IFI(AUG.LE.Xl) .AND.(AUG.GE.Xll) ) GO TO 2
IFUAUG.LE.X2) .AND. ( AUG.GE. X2 1) ) GO TO 3
IFHAUG.LE.X3) . AND. ( AUG.GE.X3 1) ) GO TO 4
IFMAUG.LE.X5) .AND. (AUG.GE. X51) ) GO TO 6
1 AIMERR = 10. DO
GO TO 7
2 AIMERR = 1A.D0
GO TO 7
3 AIMERR = 12. DO
GO TO 7
A AIMERR = 10.700
GO TO 7





FORTRAN 4 VERSION OF RUNGE-KUTTA-GILL ROUTINE
FUNCTION RKLDEQ < N. Y, F,X, H,NT)
REAL*8 Y,F,X, H, Q, HI. H2, H3 ,H6
DIMENSION Y<2), F(2), Q<25>
NT = NT +1
GO TO (l,2t3,4),NT
1 HI = H
H2 = HI * .500
H3 = HI * 2. DO
H6 = H1/6.D0
DO 11 J =1,N
11 Q(J) = O.DO
A = .500
X = X H2
GO TO 5
2 A = .2928932188134525
GO TO 5
3 A = 1.7071067811865475
X = X H2
GO TO 5
4 DO 41 I = 1,N




5 DO 51 L = 1»N
Y(L) = Y(L) A *(H * F(L) -Q(LM





INPUT DATA AND COMPUTED VARIABLE CONSTANT*
LINE OF DEPARTURE = 600.0
ASSAULT POSI T ION = 50.0
STARTING TIME(MIN.) =C.C
A FORCE INITIAL M7F = 12.00000000
D FORCE INITIAL SI7E = 4.00000000
ETA = C.500COCCC
PHO = 0.10C0C0C0
NUMBER OF A UNITS = 2.0
GAMMA = C. 38334954
RU^H niSTANCE = 4C.000COOOO
TIME PER PD PER MAN = 0. 14500000
EXPOSURE TIME PER PUSH = 0.12*33333
COORDINATION TIME = 0.16666667
TT MF PPP RD PER A FORCE = 0.62333333
PATE OF ADVANCE = 64.171122Q':>
MAX. TIME TO FIPF = 0.05900000
MIN. TIME TO FIRE = 0.025000CC
MAX. tjme TO ACOIIIPE A TGT. = 0. 16Q10ZC/)
MIN. TTME TO ACQUIRE A TGT.= G.C250OG00
max. RATE OP FIRE = 43.00000000
MIN. RATE OF FIRE = 13.812
BASIC LOAD OF AMMO = 30C.0
LAMDA = 0.66666667
AIMINO frroR(AVG)= 10.00000000
AIMING ERRORCT + TC) = 10.00000000
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